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Judgments in the United States, the United
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by David Luther Woodward**
I. Introduction
Throughout its existence, the United States of America has engaged
in commercial transactions with the United Kingdom without the bene-
fit of any agreement between the two countries as to the recognition of
the judicial acts of the other. The United States has reached no such
agreement with any country, but the United Kingdom, through Acts of
Parliament and the rulings of its courts, has developed a body of law
addressing the issues of recognition and enforcement of foreign judg-
ments. Lately, the entry of the United Kingdom into the European Eco-
nomic Community has placed at issue yet another system of law.'
Assuming the desirability, value, and possible necessity of reciprocal
recognition of agreements between countries whose citizens engage regu-
larly in commercial transactions, and further assuming the public policy
in favor of and the private convenience created by such agreements, this
article will examine what has been proposed and attempted between the
United States and the United Kingdom. In addition, the article will dis-
cuss the posture of the Member States of the European Economic Com-
munity resulting from the legal obligations imposed upon them by the
agreements reached in forming that international institution.
Thus, an analysis of the state of the law of recognition of foreign
judgments in the United States will be compared with that of the United
Kingdom. Also examined will be the result that would obtain upon the
* © 1983 David Luther Woodward.
** B. A. (Economics and Music) 1965, J. D. 1969, The Florida State University at Talla-
hassee; LL. M. 1982, The University of London.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to his tutor, Trevor C. Hartley, Reader in
Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, for his guidance; his friend
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I See generaly Smit, The Proposed United States-United Kingdom Convention on Recognition and
Enforcement ofJudgments: A Prototype for the Future?, 17 VA J. INT'L L. 443, 443-446 (1977).
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conclusion of an international agreement. Thereafter, the state of affairs
in the European Economic Community will be considered.
The anticipated effects of any international agreement on the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments cannot be examined properly
without first determining the state of the internal law of the countries
involved; especially when the proposed agreement establishes indirect
rather than direct bases of jurisdiction.2 The historical context in which
recognition practice has arisen emphasizes the need for comparison of
internal law. Most of the body of recognition law that is involved, and
any statutory treatment thereof, has developed since 1776. In both the
United States and the United Kingdom, that body of law, although
somewhat parallel in development, has resulted in differing treatments
and results.
A. The United States
In the United States, the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is a matter of state law. 3 The United States Supreme Court
has spoken to the issue only once, in Hi/ton v. Guyot.4 In that case, the
Court said that foreign judgments should generally be recognized, unless
the judgment suffers from unfairness, prejudice, fraud or lack of juris-
diction. 5  Nevertheless, the Court held that "judgments rendered
in . . . any . .. foreign country, by the laws of which [U.S.] judg-
ments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but are prima facie evi-
dence only of the justice of the plaintiffs' claim."'6 This statement, al-
though dictum, is still a reasonably accurate statement of basic law.
Because of the importance of state law to U.S. recognition of foreign
judgments, it is inaccurate to speak of an "American rule" in the area. It
is possible, however, to identify certain common state procedures, which
anyone seeking to enforce a foreign judgment in the United States will
encounter. 7 A state will generally follow only one of these procedures.
The first common state procedure was established by the Uniform
Enforcement of Judgments Act." This proposed statute, which was
adopted by only four states, 9 required that a normal lawsuit be filed to
2 See infra notes 115-122 and accompanying text.
3 Although Congress possesses the power to regulate recognition of foreign judgments,
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, it has never exercised this power; thus, the only applicable laws are
those of the several states. See von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State judgements:
Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Community and the United
States, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1044, 1046-47 (1981).
4 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
5 Id. at 202.
6 Id at 207.
7 See von Mehren & Patterson, Recognitin and Enforcement of Foretgn-CountryJudgments in the
United States, 6 L. & Pol. Int'l Bus. 37, 39 (1974).
8 13 U.L.A. 190 (1948) [hereinafter cited as 1948 ACT].
9 13 U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1983). The states are Arkansas, Illinois, Missouri and Nebraska.
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enforce a foreign judgment.' 0 Thus, the Act merely restated the com-
mon law method of enforcing foreign judgments.
The Uniform Enforcement of judgements Act was revised in 1964.11
The 1964 Act fashions a registration procedure, requiring administrative
registration of foreign judgments. 12 The Act mandates that the defend-
ant be notified of the registered judgment 13 and specifies the reasons for
which a registered judgment would not be enforced. 14 Although the
comments appended to the Act suggest that it merely restates past law,
the registration procedure clearly departs procedurally from the common
law. The 1964 Act has been enacted in twenty-one states. 15
Defenses to enforcement under the 1964 Act are those characteristic
of the common law; 16 fraud upon, or want of jurisdiction in, the render-
ing court, 17 including lack of subject matter jurisdiction and due pro-
cess.'" The failure to raise a meritorious defense at the trial of a cause
before the court of a sister-state is not a defense in the court of the state in
which enforcement is sought,' 9 nor can a defendant object to domestica-
tion upon the ground that his special appearance to contest jurisdiction
was denied, and that the sister-state judgment was entered upon a de-
fault after his failure to defend.20 It is inappropriate to raise counter-
claims in the enforcement proceeding. 2 1 When introduced in subsequent
litigation between the same parties, sister-state judgments have res judi-
cata and collateral estoppel effect. 22
The list of states that enacted the 1964 Act is long.23 Nevertheless,
the law is by no means uniform, for two reasons. First, some thirty states
and the District of Columbia, as well as other territories, follow neither
the 1964 Act nor the 1948 Act. Second, because both Acts apply, on
10 1948 ACT, supra note 8, § 2, 13 U.L.A. at 192.
'1 UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT OF 1964; 13 U.L.A. 173
(1964)[hereinafter cited as 1964 ACT].
12 Id. § 2, 13 U.L.A. at 177.
13 Id. § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 183-84.
'4 Id § 4, 13 U.L.A. at 185.
15 13 U.L.A. at 2 (Supp. 1983). The states are Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ore-
gon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
16 Both the 1948 Act and the 1964 Act adopt by reference the same defenses to enforce-
ment of a foreign judgment as are available to prevent enforcement in one state court of a
judgment delivered by another court in the same state. See 1964 Act, supra note 11, § 2, 13
UL.A. at 177; 1948 Act, supra note 13, § 8, 13 U.L.A. at 201. Defenses to enforcement of
foreign judgments are therefore a mixture of state statute and case law. Both the statutes and
the cases rely heavily on the common law. For a typical statute specifying grounds for non-
enforcement, see FED. R. Civ. P. 60.
'7 See Phares v. Nutter, 125 Ariz. 291, 293-94, 609 P.2d 561, 563-64 (1980).
18 See id. at 293, 609 P.2d at 563.
19 See Miller v. Eloie Farms, Inc., 128 Ariz. 269, 625 P.2d 332 (Ct. App. 1980).
20 See Purser v. Corpus Christi State Nat'l Bank, 258 Ark. 54, 522 S.W.2d 187 (1975).
21 See id. at 57, 522 S.W.2d at 189.
22 See Schroeder v. 171.74 Acres of Land, 318 F.2d 311, 314 (8th Cir. 1963); See also tnfta
text accompanying note 59.
23 See supra note 13.
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their faces, only to judgments of other U.S. states, 24 further legislation is
needed to make the Acts applicable to foreign nation judgments. Such
legislation has not been passed in some states which have enacted the
1964 or 1948 Act.
B Foreign Judgments in the United States
I. Recognition by the States
Chronologically, between the proposal of the two enforcement acts,
the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgements Recognition Act, 2 5 which is strik-
ingly similar to the British Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforce-
ment) Act of 1933.26 It permits recognition of a judgment of any
governmental unit other than a state or territory of the United States
that grants or denies a sum of money, except "for taxes, fine or penalty,
or a judgment in family law for support. ' '2 7 Registration occurs as an
equivalent to a sister-state judgment,28 and is barred by lack of conclu-
siveness, absence of minimal due process, and want of personal or subject
matter jurisdiction.2 9 Discretionary denial of registration occurs in cases
of preclusion of the opportunity to defend through inadequate notice,
judgments obtained by fraud, judgments which are repugnant to the rec-
ognizing state's public policy, conflicts of judgments, judgments that are
contrary to the agreement of the parties, or in cases where jurisdiction is
based solely on personal service coupled with "serious inconvenience. '30
Jurisdiction in the international sense is required, with specific require-
ments of personal service in the foreign state or voluntary appearance,
except to protect property, as bases. 3 1
In construing the Recognition Act, the reciprocity rule of HIton v.
Guyot was specifically rejected in Nicol v. Tanner.32 In Nzcol, the lower
court refused to enforce a German judgment, because Germany does not
24 1964 ACT, supra note 11, § 1, 13 U.L.A. at 176; 1948 ACT, supra note 8, § 1(a), 13 U.L.A.
at 190.
25 13 U.L.A. 417 (1962) (hereinafter cited as FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGEMENTS ACT). The
Act has been adopted in Alaska, California, Colorado, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Mich-
igan, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, and Washington. 13 U.L.A. at 168 (Supp. 1983).
26 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13 (1933).
27 FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGEMENTS ACT, supra note 25, § 2, 13 U.L.A. at 420.
28 Id § 3, 13 U.L.A. at 420.
29 Id. § 4(a), 13 U.L.A. at 422.
30 Id § 4(b), 13 U.L.A. at 422.
31 Id § 5, 13 U.L.A. at 425. Compare this definition of jurisdiction with the traditional
"two-pronged" definition of interstate jurisdiction adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Jurisdiction exists, the Court said, if 1)
the defendant has certain "minimum contacts" with the forum, and 2) assumption of jurisdic-
tion by the forum will not "offend traditional conception[s] of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 320. The definition of minimum contacts is unclear, but the contacts clearly must
amount to more than temporary physical presence. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son, 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The "two-pronged" test applies whether jurisdiction is in personam or
in rem. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
32 310 Minn. 68, 256 N.W.2d 796 (1976).
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enforce U.S. judgments. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing reciprocity not essential to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. 33
By comparison, notice in the German language of a Swiss proceeding
delivered from the Swiss Consul General to the defendant in California
by certified mail did not constitute adequate personal service, resulting
in an inconclusive judgment to which recognition and enforcement were
denied.3 4
To the extent that the judgment of a Lebanese court granted or
denied a monetary amount, that judgment would invoke the Recogni-
tion Act and require treatment of the Lebanese judgment as a sister-state
judgment even though the issues include title to, and ownership in, real
property in Alaska, Lebanon and Washington, and rights in an Italian
corporation. 35 Under proper circumstances, stays of execution are ap-
propriate when an appeal is pursued in the rendering state at the same
time recognition is sought in a sister state.36
Recognition in matrimonial cases is universally denied under the
Act because it specifically excludes such actions.3 7 The recognition, do-
mestication and enforcement of marital cases before the courts of Ameri-
can states sitting in chancery, however, has been permitted on the theory
of comity and upon the inherent power of chancery.3 8 Matrimonial
cases require that jurisdiction exist before the adjudicatory court, and
that proper jurisdiction exist in the court addressed. 39 In In Re the Mar-
riage of Red Fox ,40 the court held that a state court was not required to
give full faith and credit to an Indian tribal court's divorce decree. The
court held, however, that deference should be given to the decree in the
same manner as it is given to the decree of a foreign nation. The court
defined comity as the recognition given by one sovereign to the acts of
another upon due regard for "international duty and convenience" of
citizens of the respective sovereigns. 4 1
As in the enforcement statutes, fraud in the proceeding before the
rendering court is a defense under the Recognition Act, but it must be
33 Id. at 81, 267 N.W.2d at 803.
34 Julen v. Larson, 25 Cal. App.3d 325, 101 Cal. Rptr. 796 (1972).
35 Abadou v. Trad, 624 P.2d 287 (Alaska 1981). The Trad opinion is particularly well-
written, and is recommended for its examination of choice of forum clauses as well as recogni-
tion and enforcement practice.
36 See Stevens v. Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles, 28 Cal. App.3d 1, 4, 104
Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1972); FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGEMENTS ACT, supra note 25, § 6, 13 U.L.A.
at 427.
37 FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGEMENTS ACT, supra note 25, § 1(2), 13 U.L.A. at 419.
38 See, e.g., Wolff v. Wolff, 40 Md. App. 168, 389 A.2d 413 (1978). Butsee Hager v. Hager,-
I Ill. App. 1047, 274 N.E.2d 157 (1971); Nardi v. Segal, 90 Il. App.2d 432, 234 N.E.2d 805
(1967) (comity alone held insufficient basis on which to enforce foreign divorce decree. . . spe-
cific statutory authorization held necessary).
39 See Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942); after remand, 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
See also Note, Recognition ofForegn Divorce Decrees, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 802 (1965).
40 23 Or. App. 393, 542 P.2d 918 (1975).
41 Hilton v. Guyot, 163 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
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pleaded specifically.42
2. Role of the Federal Courts
The state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, but the federal
courts are of limited jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the federal courts is
limited to the constitutionally-defined judicial power and to the grants of
jurisdiction given by Congress. 4 3 When a United States District Court
entertains a suit under its diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,44 it must
apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits. 45 Similarly, the
district court must apply the conflicts of laws rules of the state in which it
sits.
4 6
Federal original jurisdiction must embrace a federal question; ac-
tions arising under the Constitution and the laws of the United States
and its treaties, 47 or must arise under diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,
which requires that the litigants be citizens of different states or nations,
subject to a minimum dollar amount of $10,000.48 Various U.S. statutes
grant exclusive federal jurisdiction in matters of antitrust, bankruptcy,
patents, and copyright. 49
By statute, judgments of the district courts sitting in one state may
be registered before the district court in another state, 50 but such is
merely a ministerial act. 5' Recordation of the judgment with the clerk of
the state court of general jurisdiction for the county, parish or judicial
district, or the recording office for deeds, is necessary to create a judg-
ment lien, 52 whereupon final process can be accomplished by state offi-
cials. 53 Although one might infer that the federal courts are of minor
significance, the federal courts are competent to construe state law, and
thus the law of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments. 54
Furthermore, satisfaction of due process requirements is the measure
42 FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGEMENTS AcT, § 4(b)(2), 13 U.L.A. at 269. See Davis v. Nehf, 14
Ill. App.3d 318, 302 N.E.2d 382 (1973).
43 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (3d ed. 1976). See U.S.
CONST. art. III, § 2, cls. 1-2.
44 See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
45 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
46 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
47 C. WRIGHT, supra note 43, § 17.
48 23 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
49 C. WRIGHT, supra note 43, § 10. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 7174 (1976) (giving federal courts
exclusive jurisdiction over violations of the Natural Gas Act); 18 U.S.C. §3231 (1976) (giving
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving crimes against the United States).
50 28 U.S.C. § 1963 (1976). See Stiller v. Hardman, 324 F.2d 626 (2d Cir. 1963); Juneau
Spruce Corp. v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 128 F. Supp. 697 (D. Hawaii
1955).
51 Juneau Spruce, 128 F. Supp. at 699.
52 28 U.S.C. §§ 1963, 1963A (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
53 Knapp v. McFarland, 462 F.2d 935 (2d Cir. 1972).
54 See, e.g., Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Hall, 367 F. Supp. 1009, 1912 (E.D. Ark. 1973)
("[I]t therefore becomes the duty of the court to predict as best it can how the Supreme Court of
Arkansas would answer the question").
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by which American courts determine if the foreign court has perfected
personal jurisdiction. 55 In a proceeding commenced in England on a
contract concluded by telephone, the American defendant appeared spe-
cially to test jurisdiction. When his motion was denied, he moved to
withdraw. On appeal, the English Court of Appeal overruled the trial
court's finding that appearance has been made according to English law,
and entered judgment in favor of the English plaintiff.56 The English
plaintiff sought recognition and enforcement in the United States. In
Sumportex v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp. ,57 the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that recognition should be granted, and found that juris-
diction in the international sense was lodged in Queen's Bench, that no-
tice was due and proper under Order 11, the English equivalent of long-
arm jurisdiction as exercised by Pennsylvania, and that the defendant
waived his right to defend by his default. 58
In the exercise of their specialized jurisdiction, the federal courts
have the power to domesticate foreign judgments. In International Sea Food
Ltd v. M/V Campeche,59 for example, the court recognized a judgment of
the High Court in Admiralty of the Isle of Barbados. The Fifth Circuit
has given res judicata effect to a settlement decree of a Greek court.6 °
Finding that full faith and credit is extended by the admiralty rules of
Costa Rica, a Florida district court ruled that full faith and credit should
be extended to the order of a Costa Rican court granting judicial foreclo-
sure and sale of a vessel on default of its preferred first mortgage, giving
the purchaser at the sale title superior to any claim of the plaintiff mari-
time lienors.6 1
There emerges no "American Rule" for the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments, but rather a crazy quilt arrangement of
methods for their domestication. A simple analysis shows the following
pattern:
1. Alaska, Colorado, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas and
Washington have enacted the Recognition Act and the 1964 Enforce-
ment Act, which would seem to permit administrative registration and
administrative enforcement of foreign judgments;
2. Illinois has enacted the Recognition Act and 1948 Enforcement
55 Royal Bank of Canada v. Trentham Corp., 491 F. Supp 404 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
56 Sumportex, Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., [1968] 3 All E.R. 26, 27-29.
57 Sumportex, Ltd. v. Philadephia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 197 1), cert.
dented, 405 U.S. 1917 (1972). An exhaustive annotation of the case appears at 13 A.L.R. FED.
194 (1972).
58 Sumportex, 453 F.2d at 444.
59 566 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1978).
60 Zorgias v. SS Hellenic Star, 487 F.2d 519 (5th Cir. 1973).
61 Atlantic Ship Supply, Inc. v. M/V Lucy, 392 F. Supp. 179 (M.D. Fla. 1975). But see
Grotian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons, 365 F. Supp. 707, 719
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), a'd 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975) (German court decisions regarding trade-
mark rights disregarded as "irrelevant and inadmissible" within the United States).
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Act, which would seem to permit administrative registration of foreign
judgments, but require judicial enforcement by summary judgment;
3. California, Maryland, Massachusetts and Michigan have en-
acted the Recognition Act only, thus seeming to permit administrative
recognition of foreign judgments, but requiring for enforcement a com-
mon-law suit on a judgment pursuant to local conflicts of law rules;
4. Some states that have enacted either the 1964 Revised Act or
the 1948 Act, which standing alone are inapplicable to foreign judg-
ments. (These states are in no different position than those of the follow-
ing group);
5. In the remaining states, a suit on the foreign judgment, not only
for recognition but also enforcement, must be pursued according to the
conflicts of law rules of the state in which the suit or the judgment is
filed. 6
2
Unfortunately, the entire statutory procedure may be flawed be-
cause the Commissioners either chose to ignore, or neglected to perceive,
the necessity of incorporating a rule on exchange rates in their proposed
Recognition Act.63 No state that has enacted the Act has inserted one.6 4
Because the value of the U.S. dollar in terms of any foreign currency is a
fact that must be proved, the registration aspect of the Recognition Act is
a futile pursuit unless the foreign judgment assesses a sum of money in
U.S. dollars, which is a highly unlikely situation.6 5 Conversion of the
foreign currency must be pleaded and proven in almost every instance. 66
C Foreign Judgments in the United Kingdom
Although recognition and enforcement practice has seen its greatest
development in the twentieth century, the action of tndebitatus assumpsit
was extended as early as 1813 to allow the courts of England to enforce
the judgments of foreign courts. 6 7 From those beginnings, recognition
62 See generally supra notes 15 and 25.
63 See Bishop, Obltaintg Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign-County Judgements in Texas, 45
TEX. B.J. 287, 289 (1982).
64 See Becker, The Currency ofJudgment, 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 152, 156 (1977).
65 Courts are usually required to assess damages in the currency of the country in which
they sit. See id. at 152-54. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that U.S. courts must award
damages in dollars. Bronson v. Rodes, 74 U.S. (7 Wal.) 229 (1868).
66 See Bishop, supra note 63, at 289. See also Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660
F.2d 854, 865 n.6 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 313 (1982) (remanding case for factual
determination of exchange rate). Further, the date upon which the exchange rate is determined
differs between jurisdictions. Compare Deutsche Bank Filiale Nurnburg v. Humphrey, 272 U.S.
517 (1926) (date court's judgment delivered) with Hope v. Russo-Asiatic Bank, 235 N.Y. 37, 138
N.E 497 (1923) (date cause of action arose). In diversity of jurisdiction suits, the federal courts
follow the rule of the state in which they sit. Vish/pco, 660 F.2d at 865-66.
67 See Walker v. Witter, 99 Eng. Rep. 1, 1 Dougl. 1 (1813). See also J.H. BAKER, AN IN-
TRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 397 (2d ed. 1979). Indebitatus assumpsit arose under
the theory that the defendant, already indebted to the plaintiff, undertook to pay to the plaintiff
a particular sum. Although actions for debt could only be brought in the Court of Common
Pleas, actions for assumpsit could be brought in the Court of Common Pleas or before the
King's Bench. See T. PLUNKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 644 (5th ed.
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and enforcement practice relating to foreign judgments developed along
common-law lines until the twentieth century enactment of the Adminis-
tration of Judgement Act of 1920,68 and the Foreign Judgements (Recip-
rocal Enforcement) Act of 1933.69 When common-law jurisdiction exists
in the adjudicatory court, foreign judgments are enforceable by suit on a
judgment70 provided they are conclusive, 7 1 not obtained by fraud, 72 not
contrary to the public policy of England,73 or not contrary to the princi-
ples of natural justice. 74 Also, the judgment must be for a definite sum, 75
and not for the payment of taxes or penalties. 76 To be used as a defense
in an enforcement proceeding, and to be dispositive, the foreign judg-
ment must comply with the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. 77
During the nineteenth century, the Judgements Extension Act of
186878 and the Inferior Courts Judgements Extension Act of 188279 per-
mitted the judgments of both the superior courts and the inferior courts80
sitting in one part of the United Kingdom to be registered in another
part of the United Kingdom. Not until the enactment of the Adminis-
tration of Justice Act of 192 08i did legislation embrace foreign judgments
per se.
The 1920 Act applies to the judgments of the superior courts of Her
Majesty's dominions and former colonies, and currently applies only to
those countries to which it applied at the time of the enactment of the
Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933.82 The 1933
Act applies to judgments obtained in foreign countries that may be regis-
tered in the United Kingdom if the foreign country is among those to
which the application of the statute has been extended by an Order in
Council.8 3 Orders in Council have not been extended to the United
1956). Seeking to expand its jurisdiction, the King's Bench allowed indebitatus assumpsit as an
action equivalent to debt. T. PLUNKNETT at 653.
68 10 & I IGeo. 5, ch. 81 (1929).
69 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13 (1933). See 8 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, 1 752 n.I (4th ed.
1974).
70 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, $ 715.
71 Id. 1725.
72 Id. 1 727.
73 Id 728.
74 Id. 729.
75 Id. 733.
76 Id. 733. See Her Majesty the Queen ex rel. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d
1161 (9th Cir. 1979). But see Regina v. Kemp, 69 Crim. App. 330 (1979) (forfeiture permitted
despite common-law rule).
77 Id. 1 726-37.
78 31 & 32 Vict., ch. 54 (1868).
79 45 & 46 Vict., ch. 31 (1882).
80 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, 1 749.
81 10 & II Geo. 5, ch. 81 (1920).
82 Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, §7(2), 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13
(1933). See 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, 1 752.
83 Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, § 1(l), 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13
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States or to any of its constituent states, territories, or enclaves. 4
The more significant 1933 Act is a statute of an "indirect" nature in
the international law sense.8 5 The recognition statute sets out basic con-
ditions, similar to those of the common law, that must be met if recogni-
tion is to be obtained. The basic conditions are: 1) voluntary submission
to the rendering court other than to protect property or to contest juris-
diction; 2) agreement to jurisdiction in the foreign court; 3) residence of
the defendant (if a natural person) or principal place of business of the
defendant corporation in the forum country or; 4) existence of an office
in the forum country and the dispute arising in the course of business of
that office or branch.8 6
Neither judgments obtained under a "long-arm" theory of jurisdic-
tion nor judgments from countries to which the 1933 Act does not apply
may be registered.8 7 A judgment may not be registered if it: 1) lacks
common-law personal jurisdiction; 2) lacks sufficiency of notice; 3) re-
sults from fraud; or 4) is repugnant to public policy.8 8 The resulting
judgment cannot be recognized if the subject matter of the foreign judg-
ment is immovable property outside the territorial jurisdiction of the ren-
dering court, if the defendant enjoys international immunity coupled
with no submission to the rendering court, or if the use of the rendering
court is contrary to the agreement of the parties.8 9 Also, as at common
law, judgments for taxes, fines and penalties may not be registered.90
Because of the doctrine of absence of merger of the cause of action
in a foreign judgment,9 1 and because of preliminary dismissals by foreign
courts that do not determine the merits of the cause, 92 a new local pro-
(1933). An Order in Council is an order issued by the British Sovereign with the advice of the
Privy Council. See generally 36 HALSBURY, supra note 69, I 723-24 (3d ed. 1961).
84 See 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, $ 757 n.4 (listing the countries to which Orders in
Council have been extended).
85 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, $$ 762-63. Indirect or functional statutes (or treaties) deal
only with the enforceability of one nation's judgments with another nation, and do not alter the
substantive jurisdictional law of any nation. Direct statutes (or treaties) achieve the same effect
by changing the substantive jurisdictional law of participating nations. Thus, a direct statute
might prevent a nation's courts from hearing a case, while an indirect statute would allow the
court to hear the case, but would make the court's judgment unenforceable abroad. P. WOOD,
LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE § 3.07[2] (1981).
86 Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement Act), § 4(2)(a), 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13
(1933). Seealso Vogel v. Kahnstamm, Ltd., [1973] 1 Q.B. 133, 147 (giving similar conditions as
necessary for recognition under the common law).
87 See Perry v. Zissis, [1977] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 607, 614 (C.A.); 8 HALSBURY,supra note 69, I
758; WOOD, supra note 85, § 3.06[3].
88 See Foreign Judgements (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, § 4(l)(a), 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13
(1933).8 9 1. § 4(3).
90 Id § 1(2)(b).
91 See Taylor v. Hollard, [1902] 1 K.B. 676, 682. This doctrine prevents a release in a
foreign country from automatically acting as a bar to a cause of action arising out of a contract
to be performed in Britain. The doctrine was recently abolished by the Civil Jurisdiction and
Judgement Act, 1982, ch. 31.
92 See Black-Clawson Int'l. Ltd. v. Papierwerke Waldhof-Aschafterberg A.G., 1975 A.C.
591.
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ceeding on the cause of action may be commenced. 93 If the defendant
had the opportunity to defend, but refused or declined to do so after
losing a jurisdictional battle, the resulting judgment may be recognized
and enforced.94 Nevertheless, the registration must be set aside if the
indirect definitions of jurisdiction, which are not identical to the com-
mon law, are not met.95
Should a plaintiff wish to seek recognition of a foreign judgment to
which the 1920 Act or the 1933 Act applies, he may use the registration
procedure of the Act or sue on the cause of action. He may not, however,
sue on the judgment.96 If the judgment is from a state to which the act
does not apply, the common law applies. 97
England traditionally followed the due-date or breach-date rule in
setting the exchange rate applicable to the foreign judgment. 98 More
recent decisions, however, have departed from the breach-date rule and
have allowed recovery in the foreign currency in terms of sterling if the
proper law of the contract is foreign and the terms of the contract were in
foreign currency. 99 The decisions state that the applicable date of con-
version should be the date that leave for enforcement was granted.100
Appeal of the foreign judgment in the rendering jurisdiction will not pre-
vent recognition if in that jurisdiction, as in the United States, enforce-
ment during the pendency of an appeal would be permitted.'t0
In summary, recognition occurs in one of two ways: 1) registration
pursuant to the registration procedure of the appropriate act of Parlia-
ment if the act has been made applicable to the rendering country by an
Order in Council; or 2) a suit on the judgment pursuant to common law
rules. The applicable rate of exchange will be the date on which leave to
enforce is permitted.
93 See 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, 715.
94 Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Ltd., 1976 A.C. 443.
95 Societe Coop. Sidmetal v. Titan Int'l. Ltd., [1968] 1 Q.B. 828, 848-50. See Foreign
Judgement (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act, § 4(2)(a), 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13 (1933). See also
WOOD, supra note 85, §3.07[2].
96 See 8 HALSBURY, supra note 69, 716.
97 Id 715.
98 See Tomkinson v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 1961 A.C. 1007. But see East India
Trading Co., Inc. v. Carmel Exporters & Importers, Ltd., [1952] 2 Q.B. 439 (judgment day rule
used in enforcement of Indian court judgment).
99 See, e.g., Mitangos, 1976 A.C. 443; Schorsch Meier G.m.b.H. v. Hennin, [1975] 1 Q.B.
416 (C.A.).
100 See Schorsch Meier, [1975] 1 Q.B. 416 (C.A.), citing the Treaty of Rome, tnfa note 145.
See also Henry v. Geoprosco Int'l. Ltd., [1976] 1 Q.B. 726 (C.A.). But see Tracomin, S.A. v.
Sudan Oil Seed, Ltd., [1983] 1 W.L.R. 662, 670-71 (applying §§32-33 of the Civil Jurisdiction
and Judgements Act to reverse Hleng as it applies to foreign court judgments in cases involving
prior agreements of the parties to resolve disputes by methods other than those employed by the
plaintiff in the foreign proceedings (e.g., agreements to resolve disputes by arbitration, or in
some court other than the court in which plaintiff first brought suit).
101 Colt Indus., Inc. v. Sarlie (No. 2), [1966] 3 All E.R. 85 (C.A.).
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II. The United Kingdom/United States Draft Convention
In response to a need felt by the United Kingdom, 10 2 and a desire
by the United States to avoid the "exorbitant" jurisdiction of certain
continental countries, 10 3 negotiations began in the early 1970's to pre-
pare a Draft Convention between the United States and the United
Kingdom for mutual recognition of certain classes of judgments. 0 4 In
1978, subsequent to publication of the Draft Convention, changes were
made that resulted in a text more acceptable to the representatives of the
United Kingdom. 10 5 Although the United Kingdom withdrew from ne-
gotiations in 1980,106 the accomplishments must be considered, either in
view of probable resurrection of negotiations or as a possible model for
negotiations with other countries.
As early as 1874, the United States Department of State declined to
become involved in the negotiations and conclusions of treaties in the
area of private international law, and of judgments conventions. The
State Department felt constitutional constraints on its authority to enter
the area, notwithstanding the obligations of the national government to
protect the interests of the states in the international context. 10 7 The
states, however, are constitutionally prohibited from concluding treaties
with foreign states or entering into any compact with a foreign power. 10
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution'0 9 substitutes fed-
eral policy for state policy. Similarly, international recognition should
be the result of similar court systems under similar constraints of natural
justice, giving a theoretical constitutional basis for international recogni-
tion practice. 110
The proposed Convention applies only to civil or commercial judg-
ments, and excludes judgments that are for customs duties, taxes, puni-
tive and multiple damages, provisional or interim relief, and possibly
discovery."' The proposed Convention also excludes judgments against
states and their constituent units; judgments regarding the status and
powers of persons and legal entities; and judgments regarding matters of
102 See Perry v. Zissis, [1977] 1 Lloyd's L.R. 607, 614 (C.A.).
103 See in/fa text accompanying note 195.
104 Draft Convention on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
Matters, initialed Oct. 26, 1976, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as 1976 Draft].
105 Draft Convention on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
Matters, Third Consultative Paper, March 1979, United States-United Kingdom, reprinted in the
appendix to this article, infra at - [hereinafter cited as 1979 Draft].
106 See von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1060 n.61.
107 See Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and What to Do About
It, 42 IowA L. REV. 236, 257 (1957).
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10. See also McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United
States, 42 MINN. L. REv. 709 (1958).
109 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
I10 See von Mehren & Trautman, Recognition of Foreign Adjudications." A Survey and Suggested
Approach, 81 HARv. L. REv. 1601, 1607 (1968).
I1 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 2. See Smit, supra note 1, at 446.
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a personal nature (i.e., status and rights in marital property, succession,
bankruptcy, administration of the estates of incompetents, and claims
upon public funds). 1 2 Excluded are severable parts of judgments.," 3
The Convention specifically protects against execution in England on
judgments against Americans obtained under exercise of the "exorbi-
tant" jurisdiction of some of the member states of the European Eco-
nomic Community.1 14
Although there is a strong resemblance to the Foreign Judgements
(Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933,1"5 and the Uniform Recognition of
Foreign-Money Judgements Act," 6 the Convention also extends to
nonmoney judgments such as injunctive relief and specific perform-
ance. t 7 The bases of jurisdiction are somewhat changed.'1 " Citizens
and corporations of the United Kingdom, except for those actually pres-
ent or doing business in the United States, are protected under the Con-
vention to a greater extent than at common law.' 19 There are new
grounds for refusal of recognition to protect United Kingdom citizens
and corporations, and better enforcement procedures. 120 The traditional
objections to recognition; public policy, fraud, conflict ofjudgments, and
international immunity, are preserved. 121 The rate of exchange is fixed
as of the date of the original judgment. 122
Although it has been said that in the United States recognition
under the Convention would be as a sister-state judgment absent tradi-
tional federal legislation, 12 3 a distinction exists in the United States be-
tween self-executing and non-self-executing treaties.'2 4  Lacking the
traditional language, the Convention is non-self-executing. Thus, unless
the Convention is revised to contain clauses of self-execution, or unless
Congress passes enabling legislation, state courts will not be obliged to
follow the Convention.125
112 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 2(3).
113 Id. art. 2(5).
114 d. art. 18. See also nfira notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
115 23 & 24 Geo. 5, ch. 13 (1933).
116 13 U.L.A. 417 (1962). See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
117 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 15(1).
118 Id. art. 10(b)-j). These changes are a result of compromise between the British and
U.S. common law positions. See Mathers, The US/UK C'ivi4udgments Convention, 127 NEw L.J.
777, 821-22 (1977).
119 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 10(e). See Mathers, supra note 118, at 821.
120 1979 Draft, supra note 105, arts. 7-8. See Mathers, supra note 118, at 778.
121 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 7.
122 Id art. 17(5).
123 See Hay & Walker, The Proposed Recognition-of-judgments Convention Between the United States
and the United Kingdom, II TEX. INT'L. L.J. 421, 448-49 (1976).
124 See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829) (treaties are normally self-executing,
but treaties amounting to a contract to take future action require that implementing legislation
be passed by Congress).
125 Compare Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 724-25, 242 P.2d 617, 622 (1952) (United
Nations Charter on Human Rights found "humane and enlightened," and as such entitled to
"respectful consideration," but nonetheless a "moral commitment ... not intended to
supercede domestic legislation").
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Until the adoption of the Convention, any final judgment of a state
or federal court in the United States would be recognized in the United
Kingdom if international jurisdiction existed,' 26 even though the assess-
ment of damages included punitive or exemplary damages. 127 The rec-
ognition and enforcement of multiple damages is disputed by some
authorities. 128
Among the advantages that would inure to American defendants
upon the conclusion of a treaty such as the proposed draft would be the
protection of their assets in the United Kingdom from final process as a
result of litigation in another member state of the European Economic
Community. 129 Furthermore, due to its indirect nature, the proposed
convention would not affect the local rules ofjurisdiction in either coun-
try. 130 This does not free the Draft Convention from criticism. Sugges-
tions have been made that the negotiations involved dramatic
comparisons and resulted in a document that lacks objectivity or, more
disappointingly, is an incomplete project. 13 1
A specific objection to the terms of the initial draft was that it ap-
peared to be distinctly advantageous to American litigants but was not
advantageous to parties in the United Kingdom. 132 Some felt that Arti-
cle 10, on jurisdiction, should be limited to purely contractual claims,
that the multiple damages exclusion was too narrow; and that judgments
resulting from products liability would create a "claims explosion" in the
United Kingdom. 133
In response to these and other criticisms, substantial revision is evi-
dent in the draft published in 1979. The prohibitions against customs
duties and penalties have been enlarged to include civil penalties, such as
those imposed by the Federal Trade Commission, 134 and to make civil
damages awarded in privately prosecuted American antitrust proceed-
ings unenforceable in the United Kingdom. 135
Considered most important is an addendum that permits the court
addressed to review, and at its discretion modify, the quantum of dam-
ages awarded by the adjudicatory court, and to align them with the ba-
ses of damages in the court addressed.' 3 6 The language of the provision
is fair in its construction, but it would be xenophobic in its application.
126 See North, Insurance and ForeignJudgments, 128 NEw L.J. 315 (1978).
127 S.A. Consortium Gen'l Textiles v. Sun & Sand Agencies Ltd., [1978] 1 Q.B. 279 (C.A.).
128 Se, e.g., Mathes, supra note 118, at 778.
129 See North, The Draft UK/US. Judgments Convention. A British Viwpotnt, I Nw. J. INT'L.
L. & Bus. 219, 222-23 (1979).
130 Id. at 224.
131 See generally Droz & Dyer, The Hague Conference and the Main Asues of Private International
Law for the Eighties, 3 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 155, 179-80 (1981).
132 See North, supra note 129, at 228-29.
133 Id. at 231-38. See 1976 Draft, supra note 104, art. 10, 16 I.L.M. at 78-80.
134 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 2(2)(b). See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 45-46 (1982).
135 Id. art. 7(aa).
136 Id. art. 8A.
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The apparent stimulus for its insertion seems to have come from those
who characterize American jury verdicts in tort as excessive.1 3 7 Implic-
itly, the Draft Convention fails to countenance compensation for future
medical expenses, which are substantial components of tort recovery in
the United States. Consideration for compensation of future medical ex-
penses is almost completely unnecessary in the United Kingdom because
of its differing social policy.13 a
Because the draft is indirect in its approach to jurisdiction, the Brit-
ish tort victim could recover for future medical expenses if the suit is
brought in the United States. Nothing in the draft prevents a British tort
victim from lodging his suit for damages and obtaining them by verdict
of jury in a U.S. state or federal court having jurisdiction and proper
venue under its local rules. The Draft Convention would play no part in
recognition and enforcement because the judgment rendered in the cause
would be a local judgment. 139
To assuage the anxiety of British manufacturers concerned about
products liability, provisions relating to litigation in the earlier draft are
totally revised to require that the wrongful act and the resulting injury
sustained must be events that occurred in the country in which suit was
brought.1 40 This virtually absolves the manufacturer located in one
country from liability for the injury that the negligently designed and/or
manufactured product may cause in the country where it is used or con-
sumed. From the American point of view, this places British manufac-
137 The author's private discussions with numerous practitioners, scholars and students in
the United Kingdom reveal the existence of ignorance, or at least misinformation, in the English
legal community of the practical aspects of the contingency fee system used by most American
counsel in the representation of those suffering injury. The opinion that juries automatically
inflate their verdicts to compensate the plaintiff for the fees to his attorney seems to be widely
held, and many are unaware of the possibility and occurence of remittitur on appeal. No regard
is given to the quality of representation a person of limited means can engage under the system.
Representative of the attitude of the English judiciary is the opinion of Lord Denning, M.R., in
Smith, Kline & French Labs. Ltd. v. Bloch, [1982] 1 W.L.R. 730, 733-734:
As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States. If
he can only get his case into their courts, he stands to win a fortune. At no cost to
himself: and at no risk of having to pay anything to the other side. . . . There is
also in the United States a right to trial by jury. These are prone to award
fabulous damages. They are notoriously sympathetic ....
See also Butler & Woodward, The American Contingency Fee: Fact or Fiction , 80 LAw. SOc. GA-
ZETTE 919 (1983).
138 See generally P. GEMMIL, BRITAIN'S SEARCH FOR HEALTH (1960); Rimlinger, American
Social Security in a European Perspective, in THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF SOCIAL INSURANCE (1968).
Query whether plaintiff would be permitted to introduce evidence tending to support the jury
award in a proceeding in which damages are reviewed. Would that proof take the form of the
original evidence and testimony upon which the jury award was based, or would the adducing
of additional evidence be permitted, particularly as to the comparative costs for future medical
treatment?
139 See 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 2. Consistent with traditional recognition practice,
the Draft Convention does not permit going behind the judgment to alter findings of fact and
law. Id art. 8A. That is, the Draft Convention does not permit the court addressed to review
determinations of the adjudicatory court as to liability, or contributory or comparative
negligence.
140 id art. 10().
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turers exporting products to the United States in a position of privilege
and immunity concerning any duty they may owe their ultimate user or
consumer, and erodes the effect of any judgment rendered by what is, in
fact, the final arbiter of quality control.
In its "final" form, the Convention provides protection to parties
from punitive or multiple damages 14 1 and from the so-called "excessive
verdicts" ofjuries in American cases. 142 The latter is currently the great-
est source of antipathy in recognition of American judgments in the
United Kingdom. In return, American litigants are protected from exe-
cution under judgments of courts of member states of the European Eco-
nomic Community exercising "exorbitant" jurisdiction.1 4 3 The trade-off
has the potential to protect the American and British business communi-
ties, despite the substantial sacrifice to the rights of the private litigant in
the United States, and the contravention of the basic and most expedient
tool of consumer protection and redress for breach of duty.
144
In summary, the Convention does not substantially change the fun-
damental common-law doctrines upon which the recognition of foreign
judgments has been based; rather, it provides uniform bases in both
countries. By avoiding the present divergence of systems in the states of
the United States-providing agreed tests for bases of jurisdiction, regis-
tration procedures, definitional approaches to the types of judgments
that will not be recognized, and a self-contained code replacing extant
common-law actions-the Convention provides the means for facilitat-
ing domestication of foreign judgments.
III. The Brussels Convention
By implementing Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome, 14 5 the Euro-
pean Economic Community concluded the Convention on Jurisdiction and
Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters 146 (hereinafter, the
Brussels Convention). The Convention introduced a community-wide
system of direct jurisdiction that represents political success for the com-
munity.' 4 7 Even if any of the member states of the European Economic
Community had failed to implement the Brussels Convention into its
municipal law, it is doubtful that an enforcement proceeding could have
been brought against that member state pursuant to the Treaty of
141 Id. art. 2(2)(b).
142 Id. art. 8A.
143 Id art. 18. See infta notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
144 The 1979 Draft also reflects several minor changes made to bring the proposed Conven-
tion in line with current European law and practice. See 1979 Draft, supra note 105, art. 10(c)-
(g), (j).
145 Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 220, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
146 Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Civil and Commercial Judgments,
Sept. 27, 1968. 8 I.L.M. 229 (1969) (hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention).
147 See Kohler, The Case Law of the European Court on the udgments Convention, 7 EUR. L. REV.
3, 111 (1982).
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Rome. 148
The protocol to the Brussels Convention 149 gives jurisdiction to the
Court of Justice of the European Community to interpret the convention
in a reference procedure similar to, but not precisely the same as, the
procedure under Article 177 of the Treaty of Rome.' 50
The protocol permits preliminary references to the European Court
from those national courts listed therein before which final appeals may
be brought, from national courts of the member states "sitting in an ap-
pellate capacity," and from courts of the member states that hear appeals
from recognition and enforcement proceedings.' 5' This permission is a
departure from Article 177.152 Trial courts are excluded from seeking
preliminary rulings. A "conflict jurisdiction" classification is created to
resolve such conflicts as may exist between the rulings of the court in
which the cause is lodged, and the other courts,of the member states and
the European Court. 5 3 It is believed that, absent the ability of the trial
courts to seek preliminary rulings, this procedure does permit the Euro-
pean Court to resolve conflicts between the rationale and final judgment
given by a trial court that is res judicata as compared to a ruling of the
European Court or an appeal court of a member state. 154 The conflict
must exist in this configuration because conflicts between judgments of
trial courts do not lodge jurisdiction in the European Court. 55 The
"conflict jurisdiction" cases have only prospective value, but the first cat-
148 See T. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 287-88 (1981).
149 Protocol Amending the Brussels Convention, June 3, 1971, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. NO. L
304) 50, 51 (1978).
150 Id. art. 2, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. No. L 304) at 51. See also Hartley, The Recognition of
Foreign Judgments in England under the Jurisdiction andJudgments Convention, in HARMONISATION OF
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE E.E.C. 38 (K. Lipstein ed. 1978); Kohler, supra note 147,
at 4; von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1057. Cf. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 177, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
151 Protocol Amending the Brussels Convention, art. 2, June 3, 1971, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 304) at 51.
152 Art. 177 provides:
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concern-
ing;
(a) the interpretation of this treaty
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of this commu-
nity;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of the
Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State,
that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a decision is necessary to enable it
to give judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon. Where
any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a mem-
ber state, against whose decision there is no judicial remedy under national law,
that court or tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.
Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 3.
153 See Kohler, supra note 147, at 5-6. Cf. FLA. CONST. art. V, §3(b)(3) (giving Supreme
Court of Florida authority to review district court of appeals decisions that conflict with another
decision of a district court of appeal or with a decision of the Florida Supreme Court).
154 Protocol Amending the Brussels Convention, June 3, 1971, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
304) at 51 (1978).
155 Id See Kohler, supra note 147, at 6.
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egory of preliminary appeals does have a direct influence on proceedings
before the national courts.
156
Under the Brussels Convention, there is a presumption that judg-
ments of the courts of member states are in order when presented for
registration in the courts of the member states addressed. 157 The court
addressed may not substitute its discretion, nor refuse recognition, except
in the instance of repugnancy to public policy, improper notice, conflicts
of judgments, or when status must be determined as a preliminary mat-
ter.158 It has been suggested that when a defendant seeks to resist the
recognition of a judgment on the ground of fraud, the court addressed
should stay proceedings for recognition to permit him to seek his relief
before the court which rendered the judgment. 159
The fundamental aim of the Brussels Convention is to promote "Eu-
ropean integration" through the destruction of national boundaries in
the sense that those boundaries affect legal certainty and reduce the ease
of "collecting" in commercial matters. 160 Thus, the aim is to unify pri-
vate international law, but to deter "nationalism."' 16' With the develop-
ment of the European Economic Community and the concomitant
implementation and application of the Brussels Convention, the judg-
ments of the various member states possess characteristics of sister-state
judgments not unlike the posture of the judgments of the constituent
states of the United States. 162
One of the most difficult problems in treaty drafting is agreeing on
what legitimately constitutes adjudicatory jurisdiction. 16 3 The Brussels
Convention uses a competence directe approach to jurisdiction rather than
the traditional "indirect" approach. 164 Unlike the indirect or functional
approach,165 a "direct" treaty creates jurisdictional union, designating
particular courts or types of actions in which the resulting judgments will
be recognized. A "direct" treaty also contains provisions for recognition
and enforcement. 166 The Brussels Convention is unique among treaties
of its sort because it is direct and specifically defines the bases of
156 See Kohler, supra note 147, at 6.
157 Brussels Convention, supra note 146, art. 47, 8 I.L.M. at 239. See Jenard, Report on the
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofjudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 22 O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. C 59) 1, 47 (1979).
158 Brussels Convention, supra note 146, art. 27, 8 I.L.M. at 236. See Jenard,supra note 157,
at 46.
159 Hartley, supra note 150, at 111-12.
160 Byrne & Greaves, The Brussels Convention onJurisdict on andjudgments, 131 NEW L.J. 395,
629 (1981).
161 Kohler, supra note 147, at 113.
162 See von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1045.
163 De Winter, Excesswe Jurisdiction in Private International Law, 17 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 706,
708 (1968).
164 See Mendes, The Troublesome Workings of the Judgments Convention of the European Economic
Community, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 75, 79 (1980).
165 See generally supra note 85.
166 De Winter, supra note 163, at 708-09.
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jurisdiction. 167
Under the Brussels Convention, jurisdiction is lodged in the courts
at the defendant's domicile, specifically negating the bases of "exorbi-
tant" jurisdiction found in the national law of a number of the member
states.' 68 Peculiarly, the civilians who drafted this convention adopted
the jurisdictional definition of "domicile" or "habitual residence" that
arose as a common-law concept in the British Imperial system. It is not,
however, so different from the concept used in the United States.' 69 Fur-
ther interpretation of the meaning is left to the national law of the mem-
ber states.1 70 The domicile of the defendant, not his nationality,
determines not only the member state in which an action can be
brought, but strongly influences which rules of conflicts of law will apply,
since forum courts almost always apply their own rule.' 7'
The scheme of the Convention provides that natural persons resid-
ing in a member state must be sued in the state of domicile. 7 2 A plain-
tiff may also sue at the place of the performance of the contract if: 1) it is
in another member state; 2) another member state is the habitual resi-
dence of a maintenance creditor; or 3) in the case of a business activity,
another member state is the place of the establishment of a branch or
agency. 173 Joint defendants may be sued in the country of residence of
any one of them, or in the original court in third-party and counterclaim
actions.' 74 Even when the existence of the contract is in dispute, suit
may be brought pursuant to the place-of-performance rule announced in
Article 5(1).'7'
Recognition is mandatory within the EEC unless: 1) the judgment
is contrary to the public policy of the state addressed; 2) the judgment
was entered upon a default either without due service or without ade-
quate time to effectively defend; 3) the judgment conflicts with another
judgment; or 4) in personal matters, the result in the adjudicatory court
differs from the result in the court addressed.' 76 The last category of
actions concerns preliminary matters involving legal capacity of the liti-
gant and rights in property arising out of a matrimonial situation, wills
or succession, all of which potentially conflict with the laws of the state
addressed. 177 In addition, the Convention contains specific rules on in-
167 Mendes, supra note 164, at 79.
168 von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1049-50. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text.
169 Mendes, supra note 164, at 82-83.
170 Id. at 83.
171 Bartlett, Full Faith and Credit Comes to the Common Market: An Analysis of the Provistons of the
Convention ofjur diction and Enforcement ofJudgments in Ciii? and Commercial Matters, 24 INT'L. &
COMP. L. Q. 44, 46-47 (1975).
172 Brussels Convention, supra note 132, art. 2, 8 I.L.M. at 232.
173 Id art. 5, 8 I.L.M. at 232-33.
174 Id. art. 6, 8 I.L.M. at 233.
175 Effer SpA v. Kantner, 1982 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 825, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8820.
176 Brussels Convention, supra note 146, art. 26, 8 I.L.M. at 236.
177 Id art. 27, 8 I.L.M. at 236.
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surance contracts, installment sales, and loans in conjunction with such
installment sales and consumer transactions.17
An insurance company domiciled in a member state may be sued at
its domicile or at the domicile of the policy-holder. If there are multiple
insurers or policy-holders, the insurance company may be sued in any of
the member states or at the domicile of the agent or branch.
179
Nondomicilliary insurers may be sued in the member state where the
agent or representative is domiciled.' 80 In tort, the action is brought at
the place of the tort, and direct action is permitted if the law of the
member state so permits.' 8 ' After a dispute has arisen, the parties may
agree to depart from the rules of venue even as to events that may have
occurred outside the member states.'
82
In installment sales contracts and loans facilitating such sales, the
lender may be sued at either the domicile of the lender or the debtor, but
the lender may sue only at the debtor's domicle. Counterclaims may not
be frustrated.'8 3 Like the insurance provision, the parties may agree to a
different venue.' 8 4 Exclusive jurisdiction is lodged in the national courts
in proceedings concerning land, internal corporate affairs, validity of
public records, recognition of rights in intellectual property, and the en-
forcement of judgments. '8 5
Unlike the English rule that gives the plaintiff the option of suing on
the cause of action or seeking recognition, 8 6 the Convention prohibits
new suits.' 8 7 The enforcement procedure of the Convention must be fol-
lowed even if the actual cost of registration exceeds the costs of a de novo
proceeding.' 88  The judgment that ought to have been enforced under
the terms of the Convention has res judicata effect, and may be used
defensively in such an instance.18 9
The European Court has ruled that the definition of "civil and com-
mercial matters" is broad and applies to the types of causes of action that
may arise rather than to the traditional jurisdiction of national courts. 190
Further, the application of the term "civil and commercial matters" is
made with reference to EEC law, and not to national law.' 9 ' Also, the
178 Id. arts. 7-15, 8 I.L.M. at 233-34.
179 Id. art. 8, 8 I.L.M. at 233.
180 Id. art. 9, 8 I.L.M. at 233.
181 Id. art. 10, 8 I.L.M. at 233.
182 Id art. 12, 8 I.L.M. at 234.
183 Id art. 14, 8 I.L.M. at 234.
184 d. art. 15, 8 I.L.M. at 234.
185 Id. art. 16, 8 I.L.M. at 234-35.
186 See supra text accompanying note 93.
187 Brussels Convention, supra note 146, arts. 26, 31, 8 I.L.M. at 236, 237.
188 De Wolf v. Harry Cox B.V., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1759, [1977] 2 Comm. Mkt.
L.R. 43. See Kohler, supra note 147, at 110.
189 Hartley, supra note 150, at 105.
190 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen Gmbh & Co. K.G. v. Eurocontrol, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 1541, 1552, [1977] 1 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 88, 101.
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European Court has ruled that ex parte preliminary proceedings are not
covered by the Convention and need not be recognized in the courts of
the state addressed.1 92 Service must be accomplished in due form, and
allow the defendant sufficient time to respond, and the court in which
enforcement is sought has a duty to consider such sufficiency.' 93 When
local procedural rules do not permit special appearances to test jurisdic-
tion, the European Court has ruled that, pursuant to Article 18, the de-
fendant may plead to the merits at the same time he objects to
jurisdiction. 194
Prior to the conclusion of the Brussels Convention, the state of the
law in some of the continental EEC countries violated the fundamental
tenet of Article 7 of the Treaty of Rome which prohibited discrimination
on the basis of nationality. 95 The "chauvinistic development" of "exces-
sive" or "exorbitant" jurisdiction came about in the Nineteenth Century,
prior to any cooperation in the international sense.' 96 Since the initial
drafting stage of the Brussels Convention, these "excessive" or "exorbi-
tant" bases of jurisdiction have not been permitted as against domicil-
liaries of the member states,' 97 although they are allowed against
nondomicilliaries. By the abolition of these exorbitant bases affecting
member state domicilliaries, due process is enforced, 198 but such due pro-
cess does not extend to defendants residing outside the EEC.' 99 The
binding effect of the Brussels Convention prohibits attack in the court of
the member state that is addressed unless it would otherwise be contrary
to the public policy of the court addressed. 20 0
The rule permits a national of the country exercising exorbitant ju-
risdiction to sue a nondomicilliary in the plaintiff's national court and,
upon entry ofjudgment, to use the mechanics of the Brussels Convention
to execute on property the defendant may have in another member state.
Assuming proper notice, if the defendant should choose not to appear,
the resulting judgment is enforceable. The rule has variations, but it has
been said that "[ain alien who leaves his slippers in a hotel room in Ger-
many can be sued there for a debt of, [for example], .100,000
deutschmarks due to the presence of assets within the jurisdiction."'20 1
192 Denilauler v. S.n.c. Couchet Freres, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1553, [1981] 1 Comm.
Mkt. L.R. 62.
193 Klomps v. Michel, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1593, [1982] 2 Comm. Mkt. L.R. 773.
194 Etablissements Rohr S.A. v. Ossberger, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2431, [1982] 3
Comm. Mkt. L.R. 29.
195 Mendes, supra note 164, at 76. See Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, art. 7, 298
U.N.T.S. 3.
196 De Winter, supra note 163, at 706.
197 Brussels Convention, supra note 146, art. 3, 8 I.L.M. at 232.
198 See Bartlett, supra note 171, at 60.
199 von Mehren, supra note 3, at 1050.
200 Id at 1054. The "contrary to public policy" test may not be applied to purely jurisdic-
tional rulings, however, as those decisions interpret "Convention" law (the policies of which
were adopted by all EEC nations). Id.
201 De Winter, supra note 163, at 707.
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Under French law, a nonresident French plaintiff may require a defend-
ant to defend in France even though the defendant never even con-
tracted with any Frenchman, 20 2 although other cases seem to evidence a
retreat from this view.20 3
The Brussels Convention creates a serious problem for outsiders who
may be subject to suit in a member state exercising exorbitant jurisdic-
tion while possessing assets in another member state. 20 4 Opting out of
this situation is permitted under Article 59 of the Brussels Convention by
the use of a bilateral convention such as the United Kingdom/United
States Draft. 20 5
In summary, the Brussels Convention departs from the traditional
indirect methods of defining bases for jurisdiction which enunciate spe-
cific rules to alter jurisdictional bases of the member states when both
litigants are community domicilliaries demanding unquestioned recogni-
tion of the resulting judgment in the courts of the member state
addressed.
IV. Conclusion
Absent a convention on recognition of judgments, uncertainty will
exist in the area of recognition and enforcement. 20 6 The United States
Supreme Court has never determined whether the domestication of the
judgments of foreign courts presents a federal question. 20 7 Although rec-
iprocity may be said to exist between those states that have enacted the
legislation and those countries that have traditionally relied on reciproc-
ity as a basis for recognition, 20 8 it has been demonstrated here that state
legislation concerning recognition and enforcement along the lines of
Uniform Acts proposed by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has met with a resounding lack of success. Many civil-law nations, unac-
customed to decisional law and the doctrine of stare decisis, have refused
to recognize the existing case authority based upon reciprocity and have
denied recognition to the judgments of American courts.20 9
Under present practice, some courts in the United States have devel-
202 De Winter, supra note 163, at 706-07 (citing Re "La Metropole" in Paris v. W.H. Muller
in London, Cour de Cassation, March 21, 1966, Dalloz 1966 I, 429).
203 Nadelmann,supra note 107, at 243 (citing Charr v. Hasim, Paris App. (1st Ch.), Oct. 21,
1955, 1955 Recueils Dalloz & Sirey Jurisprudence 61).
204 Hay & Walker, The Proposed U.S -UK. Recognition-of-Judgments Convention.- Another Perspec-
ttve, 18 VA. J. INT'L L. 753, 757 (1978).
205 Brussels Convention, supra note 146, art. 59, 8 I.L.M. at 241.
206 Brenscheidt, The Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments in the Federal Repub-
licofGermany, I I INT'L LAW. 261, 276 (1977) (referring specifically to the uncertainties in comity
between the United States and Germany).
207 See Note, Foreign Nation Judgments: Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Florida
and the Status of FloridaJudgments Abroad, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 588, 591 (1979). See generally Com-
ment,Judgments Rendered Abroad- State Law or Federal Law?, 12 VILL. L. REv. 618 (1967).
208 See Brenscheidt, supra note 206, at 270.
209 Carl, Proposed Legislation: Uniform Foreign Country Judgments Recognition Act, 40 TEx. B.J.
40, 40 (1977).
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oped a presumption that not only do the results in English law procedur-
ally and substantially comport with general concepts of the law of an
American state, 210 but that they are not violative of the American con-
cept of due process. 2 t" The failure of the United States to "speak with
one voice" is a particular defect in recognition practice. One of the
objectives of any convention between the United States and another
country would be to impose a uniform federal standard internally,
whether recognition is sought in state or federal court. 2 12
An examination of the United Kingdom/United States Draft
reveals how political considerations in the area of excessive jury verdicts
and multiple damages in actions such as antitrust have been traded to
reach a recognition formula that sacrifices the rights of individual liti-
gants for the protection of business interests. The English abhorrence of
these elements of American practice can only be matched by what, to the
American mind, are the excesses of continental jurisdiction. The obvious
principal consideration on the part of the United States in the conclud-
ing of such a treaty would be simply to avail itself of the benefits of
Article 59 of the Brussels Convention.2 13
210 See, e.g., Fisher, Brown & Co. v. Fielding, 67 Conn. 91, 34 A. 714 (1895).
211 See Comment, The Efct of the Proposed US/UK Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of
Civil udgments Treaty on Current Practice in the United States, 78 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 119, 128
(1975). This deference to English procedural safeguards is unique, however, and probably due
to the "deep roots of the American Legal System in the British Legal tradition." Id at 122-23.
212 Id. at 120.
213 Smit, supra note 1, at 445.
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APPENDIX
CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND AND
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PROVIDING FOR THE RECIPROCAL RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL MATTERS*
The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and
the United States of America:
Desiring to provide on the basis of reciprocity for the recognition
and enforcement of judgments in civil matters;
Have agreed as follows:
CHAPTER I: USE OF TERMS
Article 1
In this Convention:
[(a-) "consumer" means a person who enters into an agreement for
a purpose outside his trade or profession;]
(a) "counterclaim" includes a cross action;
(b) "court addressed" includes any authority to which application
is made for recognition or enforcement of a judgment under
this Convention;
(c) "court of a Contracting State" means any court exercising ju-
risdiction for a "territory" of a Contracting State, but does not
include any international court;
(d) "court of origin" means the court which gave a judgment for
which recognition or enforcement is sought under this
Convention;
(e) "defendant" means the defendant -in [person against whom]
the original proceedings [were brought] including, where ap-
propriate, a dcfda-t to [the person against whom] a counter-
claim [was brought];
( ludi- , ........ a . ", a the - -: ' . . . . ..at-
(g) "respondent" means the person against whom recognition or
enforcement is sought;
(h) "review" includes appeal;
(i) "territory" means, as may be appropriate, the United King-
dom, a constituent part thereof, or the area adjacent to the
United Kingdom over which its courts exercise jurisdiction,
the United States, a constituent part thereof, the area adjacent
* Material enclosed in brackets constitutes revisions proposed in the course of the UK-US
negotiations that began on September 18, 1978. Material that is lined through constitutes
deletions proposed in the course of the same negotiations.
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to the United States over which its courts exercise jurisdiction,
the area in or adjacent to the United States over which a fed-
eral court of the United States exercises jurisdiction, or any
territory to which this Convention shall have been extended
under Article 23; and
(I) "territory of origin" means the "territory" for which the court
of origin was exercising jurisdiction; [and]
[(k) the "law generally applicable" in a court does not include
treaties or international arrangements on the general recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments
(i) to which a Contracting State is a party when this
Convention enters into force or
(ii) ancillary to the Treaty, establishing the European
Economic Community signed at Rome on 25th
March 1957, or legislation implementing such trea-
ties or arrangements.]
CHAPTER II: SCOPE OF THE CONVENTION
Article 2
(1) This Convention shall apply to judgments given [in proceedings
instituted] after this Convention enters into force, by courts of the Con-
tracting States in the exercise of their civil or commercial jurisdiction
and, for the purposes of Article 18, to civil or commercial judgments
given by courts of third States [where recognition or enforcement is
sought after the entry into force of this Convention]. Such application
shall be irrespective of the name given to the proceedings which gave rise
to the judgment or of the name given to the judgment, such as order or
decree.
(2) Except for the purposes of Article 18, this Convention shall not
apply to judgments:
(a) for customs duties, taxes and other charges of a like nature;
(b) to the extent that they are for punitive or multiple damages [or
civil penalties];
(c) .h.ch te v t,,, 1 [granting provisional or interim relief or
protection];
(d) for disclosure of evidence [or otherwise concerned with the con-
duct of proceedings];
(e) given by or on appeal from administrative tribunals;
(f) against States, including their constituent units;
(g) determining the existence or constitution of legal persons or the
powers of their officers or directors; or
(h) determining questions relating to damage or injury resulting
from a nuclear incident.
(3) This Convention shall not apply to judgments which determine:
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(a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons;
(b) matters of family law, including marital rights in property;
(c) maintenance claims, obligations assumed in whole or in part to
satisfy a legal obligation to support another, or claims seeking to
recover all or part of amounts paid by another for maintenance;
(d) matters of succession to, or the administration of, estates of de-
ceased persons;
(e) issues in bankruptcy proceedings, in proceedings for the reor-
ganisation or winding-up of companies or other legal persons, or
in proceedings for judicial arrangements, compositions and
analogous matters;
(f) matters of social security or public assistance to the extent that
the claim lies against a public fund or authority;
(g) matters concerning the judicial supervision of the administra-
tion of the property or affairs of a person who is incompetent or
incapable of managing and administering his property and
affairs.
(4) This Convention shall apply to a judgment where the court of
origin, in order to determine an issue not falling under paragraph (2)(g)
or (h) or paragraph (3) of this Article, had to determine a matter falling
within these provisions as a preliminary issue. [Such preliminary deter-
minations shall, however, be entitled to binding effects under Article 13
only where recognition or enforcement of the judgment on the issue for
which the preliminary determination was required is in question.]
(5) Severable parts of a judgment in respect of different matters
[only some of which fall within the scope of this Convention] shall be
entitled to recognition or enforcement under this Convention if [to the
extent that] such parts would have been so entitled had they taken the
form of separate judgments.
Article 3
-" , t. ... .f a jun ennnt of a t t of a. st, .. .. Stat.. if that
CHAPTER III: CONDITIONS OF RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT
Article 4
(1) A j udrIjen gi ve,, a co. -t ........ ac..ig, S... shall, at-
J t o . p-o-visionsof t-his "-,. v e. , , be. x ,-,- ... in t -t itu, Of
Wa' it vvaa ei ven by 2tu COl !NtVirn t ittidictio,. tid Atti 10 or
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stanngz that an apqpliit for *Leviewr mnay be pe~nding, asgansat
it, o. that it may s be.. ... subj.c t t ....... , in t _at" . ......
[(1) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, a judgment given
by a court of a Contracting State shall be recognized in the territory of
the other Contracting State if it was given by a court having jurisdiction
under Article 10 or 11, notwithstanding that an application for review
may be pending against it or that it may still be subject to review.]
(2) A judgment entitled to recognition under paragraph (1) shall,
subject to the provisions of this Convention, be enforced in the territory
of the other Contracting State if it is entitled to enforcement in the terri-
tory of origin.
(3) To the extent that judgments given by courts of a Contracting
State are inconsistent, priority shall be determined for the purposes of
paragraphs (1) and (2) as follows:
(a) where the judgments were given in more than one territory of
the Contracting State, any priority accorded by the law of that
State shall be recognised; and
(b) where the judgments were given in a single territory of the Con-
tracting State, any priority accorded by the law applicable in
the courts of that territory shall be recognised.
Article 5
(1) Where a judgment is subject to any form of review under the
law applicable in the court of origin, and the respondent satisfies the
court addressed that review has been or will be sought, the court ad-
dressed may grant or defer recognition or enforcement in accordance
with the law applicable in that court.
(2) Where recognition [of a judgment] is sought in proceedings re-
specting a different cause of action [from that on which the judgment
was given], binding effects shall not be accorded to the judgment until all
ordinary forms of review [available under the law applicable in the court
of origin] have been exhausted. However, the court [addressed] may sus-
pend the proceedings.
Article 6
Recognition or enforcement of a judgment is not required by the
Convention if:
(a) by reason of the subject-matter of the action, exclusive juris-
diction over the claim adjudicated lies, under the law applica-
ble in the court addressed, in courts or authorities other than
those of the territory of origin; or
(b) the judgment was given in proceedings brought [, in the view
of the court addressed,] in violation of an agreement between
the parties to the original proceedings giving exclusive juris-
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diction to a court or other authority, or to an arbitral tribunal;
or
(c) the judgment relates to an issue, arising under a trust instru-
ment, in respect of which, by virtue of the terms of that instru-
ment, exclusive jurisdiction lies [, in the view of the court
addressed,] in courts or authorities other than those of the ter-
ritory of origin.
Article 7
Recognition or enforcement of a judgment is not required by this
Convention:
(a)' where recognition or enforcement of the judgment would be
manifestly repugnant to public policy;
[(aa) the subject matter of the action was one that, under the law
applicable in the territory of the court addressed, could, in
principle, give rise only to penal measures or measures coer-
cive at the instance of the government or an agency thereof.]
(b) where the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(c) if proceedings based on the same transaction or occurrence:
(i) have resulted in an irreconcilable judgment by a court or
authority of the Contracting State of the court addressed;
(ii) are pending before a court or authority of the Con-
tracting State of the court addressed, were the first to be
instituted, and may result in such an irreconcilable judg-
ment; or
(iii) have resulted in an irreconcilable judgment by a court or
authority of a third State that qualifies for recognition or
enforcement under the law applicable in the court
addressed;
(d) if, in the view of the court addressed, either respondent enjoys
immunity from the jurisdiction of that court or the defendant
should have enjoyed immunity in the original proceedings; or
(e) where, to give its judgment, the court of origin had to decide a
question relating to a matter specified in paragraph 2 (g) or (h)
or (3) of Article 2, and the decision differs from that which
would have followed from the application to that question of
the rules of private international law applicable in the court
addressed.
Article 8
If the defendant or his successor in interest so requests, recognition
or enforcement of a judgment is not required by this Convention:
(a) where the defendant did not receive either actual notice of the
proceedings in sufficient time to enable him to present his case
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or constructive notice substantially equivalent to that accepted
by the law applicable in the court addressed;
(b) where jurisdiction for the purposes of paragraph (1) of Article 4
is based on the agreement of the parties, the defendant did not
appear, and in the view of the court addressed the agreement is
invalid;
(c) to the extent that recognition or enforcement would afford a
recovery exceeding monetary limits upon liability fixed by a
statute of the territory of the court addressed which applies
under that court's rules of private international law;
(d) where, tinder th .I I -- ....... i ..i.. at ..al lavv f [if the case
had been brought in] the court addressed, its own [substantive]
law would have been applicable to t.. case if t had bn..
bmgsht iv. that cou-t and the judgement disregards [any] provi-
sions of that law which wotd [could not] have been applied
[excluded] by that-eut-t even if [agreement of] the parties had
,.ho j ll an,.lthe.z S t,.al Of lavv,
(e) where the judgment is one recognizing or enforcing another
judgment; or
(f) to the extent that the judgment gave relief directly against a
person, natural or legal, whose liability results from an obliga-
tion of indemnification and that liability does not, under the law
selected in accordance with the rules of private international
law applicable in the court addressed, arise until liability has
been established on the part of the person entitled to
indemnification.
[Article 84
Where the respondent establishes that the amount awarded by-the
court of origin is greatly in excess of the amount, including costs, that
would have been awarded on the basis of the findings of law and fact
established in the court of origin, had the assessment of that amount
been a matter for the court addressed that court may, to the extent then
permitted by the law generally applicable in that court to the recogni-
tion and enforcement of foreign judgments, recognize and enforce the
judgment in a lesser amount.]
Article 9
Except as permitted by this Convention, there shall be no review of
the judgment given by the court of origin, and recognition or enforce-
ment shall not be refused for the reason that the court of origin reached a
result different from that which would have been reached by application
of the law selected in accordance with the rules of private international
law applicable in the court addressed.
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Article 10
A judgment is given by a court having jurisdiction for the purposes
of paragraph (1) of Article 4 where one of the following can be
established:
(a) the respondent or his predecessor in interest brought the origi-
nal proceedings;
(b) the defendant had, at the time when the proceedings were insti-
tuted, a place of habitual residence within the territory of ori-
gin, or, if the defendant is not a natural person, had a principal
place of business there, or was incorporated, or if unincorpo-
rated had its headquarters, there;
(c) the defendant had a branch or other establishment (other than
a subsidiary [or other affiliated] corporation) within the terri-
tory of origin and the proceedings were in respect of a transac-
tion or occurrence arising from business done by or through
that establishment;
(d) the defendant, not acting pursuant to a statutory requirement,
by an agreement in writing or by an oral agreement confirmed
in writing [or, in international trade or commerce, in a form
which accords with practices in that trade or commerce of
which the parties are or ought to have been aware,] had agreed
expressly in respect of disputes which had arisen or might arise
regarding a specified legal relationship, to submit to the juris-
diction of the court of origin, or of the courts of the territory of
origin;
(e) the defendant had been conducting business on a continu-
ing basis within the territory of origin otherwise than
through a subsidiary [or other affiliated] corporation, had
appointed an agent to receive service of process there in
respect of such business, and the proceedings were in re-
spect of a transaction or occurrence arising from such
business;
in) t h. cas of a '.AJLLLJ to. supl god o, se c h
coclsio f th . nntiat was pui e y an in vitp tL,,.
to ti tat m.ade, by ad veti gnnt orn ostemvis ipt. h in v.,
tile 5  Of.. . th e . ...PC! f0 te Of tile L .. .. Sn r. .
Coll ttn lll tiv-- Of l p-- itae t t Le, , a t _'J te t . n
WhIC 0 ill StnLstantal pa.t wihi thnat tnis.n,
[(f) in the case of a contractual claim arising out of an agree-
ment to supply goods or services concluded with a con-
sumer, the conclusion of the agreement was in the territory
of origin preceded by a specific invitation addressed to him
or by advertising and the consumer took, in that territory,
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the steps necessary on his part for the conclusion of the
agreement;]
(g) in the case of a contractual claim the parties to the con-
tract [were resident] or, if not natural persons, had a place
of business, in the territory of origin at the time the con-
tract was concluded and the obligaton in issue was to be
wholly or mainly performed there;
(h) in the case of an action whose object was to determine
rights of ownership, use, possession or security in immova-
ble or tangible movable property, that property was situ-
ated within the territory of origin when the action was
instituted;
(i) in the case of an action whose object was to decide upon
the validity, construction, interpretation, variation or im-
plementation of a trust instrument or to determine dis-
putes under that instrument between or among trustees
and beneficiaries, the trust's principal place of administra-
tion was within the territory of origin, or the trust instru-
ment provided expressly or by implication that the courts
of that territory should have jurisdiction in such actions;
in the cas.. .. .an... dhaato fo. physic.al
-u ~ ~ il ....... 1 0,1- fc , damage ' -" s to... .  ... ta, ngible ptap,.tty, the
act otonissonthat uttasoned dt iuj Us y ot damnage substan
ti 1 1 7 v, ,. ..... , 1 .a ioju y tOf dannarC V'M-Sjafftx-d, it. . th
..... a t Ln _ State *in ... tle t ut Jf tiniin VL_
jun ndictium., and cihe thian ats mi onnntiina auhoanntialiy e
cat ,en that i,ju y oi damage wa stiffer, in he. t i t o Y 0
[() in the case of an action to recover damages for physical injury
to the person or for damage to tangible property:
(i) the acts or omissions that occasioned the injury or damage
were committed by the defendant or his employee or, in
the case of a legal person, its officer or employee, who was
physically present in the territory of the Contracting State
in which the court of origin was exercising jurisdiction;
(ii) the acts or omissions substantially occurred and the injury
or damage was suffered in that territory; and
(iii) either the acts or omissions substantially occurred or the
injury or damage was suffered in the territory of origin.]
[(k) any other ground then admitted for the purposes of recognition
of foreign judgments by the law generally applicable in the
court addressed.]
Article 11
A judgment on a counterclaim is given by a court having jurisdic-
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tion for the purposes of paragraph (1) of Article 4 where one of the fol-
lowing conditions is satisfied:
(a) the respondent or his predecessor in interest voluntarily brought
the counterclaim;
(b) the court of origin would have had jurisdiction to try the coun-
terclaim as a principal claim under sub-paragraphs (b)-(j) [(k)]
of Article 10; or
(c) the court of origin had jurisdiction under Article 10 to try the
principal claim and the counterclaim arose out of the transac-
tion or occurrence on which the principal claim was based.
ArtIde 12
In determining whether jurisdiction for the purposes of paragraph
(1) of Article 4 is established under Articles 10 and 11, the court ad-
dressed shall not be bound by any conclusions [of law] reached by the
court of origin , ,1C,03,1 tv t,,. applic.,ion of these A.  ,.1 , . The court
addressed shall, howeve., be bound by findings of fact made by the court
of origin unless the respondent establishes that they are incorrect. The
respondent may not dispute such findings where the defendant appeared
in the court of origin and failed to challenge its ju .i.ctio. [dispute there
the relevant issue of fact].
CHAPTER IV: EXTENT OF RECOGNITION
Artide 13
(1) A judgment entitled to recognition under this Convention shall,
in any proceedings in the other Contracting State between the same par-
ties, be given the same binding effect as if it were a judgment of the court
addressed. However, the court addressed may, if the interests of justice
so require, and shall, if the respondent so requests, give the judgment
such binding effects as it would be given under the law of the territory of
origin.
(2) For the purpose of this Article, parties shall include all persons
who were represented by parties in the original proceedings and the suc-
cessors and assigns of such persons or parties.
CHAPTER V: PROCEDURES FOR RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT
Article 14
Reonto und. tis, CG, 1 1 ventionll 1 b.. attuide t upain pien ,-'
d. .s.e d . .. -" n t.. .. e aiit.
[The procedures for recognition shall, except as otherwise provided
in this Convention, be governed by the law applicable in the court
addressed.]
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Article 15
(1) A judgment for the payment of money which is entitled to en-
forcement under this Convention shall, to the extent that it has not been
fully satisfied or carried out, be enforced by the court addressed. To the
extent that a judgment orders forms of relief other than the payment of
money, the court addressed may refuse enforcement or may order any
measures of enforcement which the law of the court addressed permits
for similar domestic judgments.
(2) The court addressed may require [that an application for en-
forcement be accompanied by]:
(a) a copy of the judgment authenticated by the court of origin;
(b) unless the required information is set forth in the judgment,
di....ntay evi e a. [proof of] the form and modalities
of the notice given the defendant and to the ..... utpu.ni
vv l 1 ch ja isd,.,tXi 1 wa asauinied;
(c) a statement of the grounds relied upon to establish the jurisdic-
tion of the court of origin under Articles 10 and 11; and
(d) an- affidavit [proof] of such other ftcts [matters] as may be re-
quired by the rules *f [applicable in] the court addressed.
[(3) The procedures for enforcement shall, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this Convention, be governed by the law applicable in the court
addressed.]
Article 16
(1) A judgment given in the United Kingdom shall be enforced in
the United States by that procedure which provides for a form of notice
to the respondent and is the simplest and most rapid provided by the law
applicable in the court addressed for the enforcement of non-local judg-
ments. Application for enforcement may be made to any court which
exercises jurisdiction for the territory where enforcement is sought and
which is competent to afford the relief requested.
(2) A judgment given in the United States shall be registered for
enforcement in the United Kingdom upon application made to a court
of competent jurisdiction.
Article 17
(1) A period of six years from the date of the original judgment, if
review has not been sought in a court of the territory of origin, or from
the date of the most recent judgment if review has been sought, shall be
allowed for applications for enforcement under Article 16. However, no
application shall be entertained where the judgment is no longer entitled
to enforcement in the territory of origin.
(2) No security for costs may be required of any person applying for
enforcement of a judgment entitled to recognition under this Convention
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except where enforcement is granted of a judgment still subject to
review.
(3) Interest recoverable on a judgment enforced under this Conven-
tion shall, in respect of the period preceding the date on which enforce-
ment is granted under paragraph (1) of Article 16 or registration for
enforcement is effected under paragraph (2) of Article 16, be at such rate,
if any, as may be specified in the judgment or in a certificate given by the
court of origin.
(4) From the date on which enforcement is granted under para-
graph (1) of Article 16 or registration for enforcement is effected under
paragraph (2) of Article 16, the judgment shall, for enforcement pur-
poses, including prescriptive time limits and interest charges, be treated
as a judgment given on that date by the court addressed.
(5) Money judgments entitled to enforcement under this Conven-
tion may be enforced by the court addressed either in the currency speci-
fied in the judgment or in the local currency at the buying rate in the
place where and on the date when enforcement is granted under para-
graph (1) of Article 16 or registration for enforcement is effected under
paragraph (2) of Article 16.
CHAPTER VI: RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
THIRD STATE JUDGMENTS
Article 18
(1) Subject to any obligations under a treaty existing at the date of
entry into force of this Convention or arising as the result of the accession
of further States to such a treaty, a judgment given by a court or other
authority of a third State against a person who is a national of a Con-
tracting State or who has a domicile, a place of residence or a place of
business, or which is incorporated or has its registered office, in a Con-
tracting State shall be refused recognition or enforcement by the courts
of the other Contracting State at the request of the respondent:
(a) where, pursuant to a treaty obligation, the courts of the third
State would be precluded from exercising jurisdiction in pro-
ceedings against a person having the same connection with the
State of the court addressed as the person sued had with the
other Contracting State, or
(b) where the judgment would, if it had been given against a person
having the same connection with the State of the court ad-
dressed, be denied recognition or enforcement on jurisdictional
grounds or because proper notice was not given.
(2) The provisions of paragraph (1) shall also be subject to any new
treaty obligations assumed by a Contracting State where the
consent of the other Contracting State has been obtained.
RECOGNITION & ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL JUDGMENTS
CHAPTER VII: FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 19
This Convention shall not prevail over other treaties in special fields
to which both Contracting States are or shall have become Parties.
Article 20
A Contracting State may, on the exchange of instruments of ratifi-
cation or at any time thereafter, declare that it will not apply the Con-
vention to judgments given by courts of the other Contracing State in
respect of cultural objects which, having been determined by the compe-
tent authorities of the declaring Contracting State to be of cultural sig-
nificance, are imported in the State for temporary display or exhibition
pursuant to an agreement entered into between the object's foreign own-
er or custodian and that State or one or more cultural institutions
therein.
Article 21
Either Contracting State may, on the exchange of instruments of
ratification or at any time thereafter, declare that it will not apply the
Convention to a judgment that imposes a liability which that State is not
under a treaty obligation toward any other State not to recognize or en-
force. Any such declaration shall specify the treaties containing the said
obligations.
Article 22
The Contracting States may, by an exchange of notes, define the
meaning of the term "habitual residence" as used in this Convention.
Article 23
(1) Either Contracting State may, on the exchange of instruments
of ratification or at any time thereafter, declare that this Convention
shall extend to any territory for the international relations of which it is
responsible. Any extension of the Convention under this Article shall
enter into force three months after the date of the notification, and may
be terminated by six months' notice of termination.
(2) Termination of the Convention in accordance with Article 25
shall, unless otherwise expressly agreed by both Contracting States, ter-
minate it in respect of any territory to which it has been extended in
accordance with paragraph (1) of this Article.
Article 24
Any difficulties which may arise in connection with the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention shall be settled through the diplo-
matic channel or through any other means agreed by the Contracting
334 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
States. Any such difficulty which is not settled by agreement may be
submitted by either Contracting State to the International Court of Jus-
tice for decision upon three months' notice to the other Contracting
State.
Article 25
This Convention shall be subject to ratification. Instruments of rati-
fication shall be exchanged at _ . The Convention shall enter
into force three months after the date on which the instruments of ratifi-
cation are exchanged and shall remain in force for three years. If neither
of the Contracting States gives notice to the other, not less than six
months before the expiration of the said period of three years, of inten-
tion to terminate the Convention, it shall remain in force until the expi-
ration of six months from the date on which either of the Contracting
States gives notice of termination.
Article 26
This Convention shall be known as the "United Kingdom/United
States Civil Judgments Convention 197. .. "
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorised
thereto, have signed this Convention.
Done in duplicate at this __ day of 19
For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland:
For the United States of America:
